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Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the more interesting things about writing evidence surveys for
the Mercer Law Review for almost twenty years has been watching
evidentiary rules rise and, sometimes, fall. No rise has been more
dramatic than Georgia's necessity exception to the hearsay rule. Its fall,
or partial fall, should be equally dramatic as a result of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington,' which
knocked the constitutional underpinnings from underneath the necessity
exception. As discussed in many prior surveys, sometimes with tentative
and respectful criticism, the necessity exception, despite a few minor
setbacks, has become a vehicle for the admission of hearsay of a nature
that likely has Professors Wigmore and McCormick spinning in their
graves. One could argue that if its expansion were to continue at the
same rate, there would soon be little need for witnesses at all; law
enforcement officers could simply bring their recorded statements to
court and read them to the jury. That is, of course, an exaggeration, but
no one can deny that the scope of admissible hearsay bears little
resemblance to the hearsay rule of only twenty years ago.
In Crawford defendant contended the trial court improperly allowed
the jury to hear his wife's tape recorded statement to police officers,
which the prosecution tendered after his wife invoked her spousal
privilege, and thus, was unavailable to testify at trial.2 The trial court
and the Washington Supreme Court, held that the circumstances of the
statement made it sufficiently reliable to overcome defendant's argument
that the admission of the out-of-court statement violated his Sixth

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta
State University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D.,
cum laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
2. Id. at 1356-57.
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Amendment3 right of confrontation.4 In fact, under Ohio v. Roberts,5
courts have long allowed the admission of hearsay statements if the
statements fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or if they bore
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."6 It was this latter
language-"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"-that courts
across the country interpreted as a green light to admit hearsay
testimony. In Georgia this bypass around the Sixth Amendment came
to be known as the necessity exception to the hearsay rule.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Crawford and took aim at
Roberts.7 The Court, going back to early English common law, concluded that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly
its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."' In
other words the drafters of the Sixth Amendment did not intend that it
would be limited to in-court testimony.9 However, neither did they
intend the right of confrontation to apply to all out-of-court statements;
the Sixth Amendment expressly encompasses only "witnesses" against
the accused.1" Thus, the Court concluded the Sixth Amendment was
intended to apply to ",testimonial'" statements." Testimonial statements include affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony, and
"similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used 'prosecutorially.'"' 2 While the Court did not define with any
great precision what is and is not a testimonial statement, it made clear
that interrogations by13 law enforcement officers are, without a doubt,
testimonial in nature.
Having decided that the Sixth Amendment applied to defendant's
wife's statement, the Court then concluded, again based on its historical
analysis, that the framers "would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 4 The Court decided these two

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1364.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23).

13. Id.
14. Id. at 1365.
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conclusions were clearly inconsistent with Roberts because "[tihe
unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements
that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 5 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court overruled Roberts.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor,
argued that it was unnecessary to overrule Roberts and claimed that the
"Court's distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements,
contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our current
doctrine." 7 However, perhaps the most notable point of the concurring
opinion was its assertion that the majority had implicitly recognized
"that the mistaken application of its new rule by courts which guess
wrong as to the scope of the rule is subject to harmless error analysis,"'" a clear escape valve for state courts that had long admitted
constitutionally infirm hearsay statements. As discussed below, Georgia
courts have already begun their struggle to reconcile Crawford with
their fondness and affection for the necessity exception.
II.

OBJECTIONS

It is a basic, but often overlooked, fact that a party seeking to appeal
a trial court's evidentiary ruling excluding evidence must not only make
a contemporaneous objection, but must also make an appropriate proffer.
In Sharpe v. Department of Transportation,19 a case discussed in
previous surveys," the supreme court expanded the contemporaneous
objection rule by abolishing the use of an after-the-fact motion to strike
illegal evidence. 2 ' Sharpe left one exception to the contemporaneous
objection rule-hearsay evidence, even if not objected to, that is wholly
without probative value and cannot support a verdict.22
In a previous survey, 23 the author predicted that this exception to the
contemporaneous objection rule-like the motion to strike illegal
evidence-might soon meet its demise. 24 However, based upon an

15. Id. at 1371. Without a doubt, the same thing can be said of Georgia's necessity
exception.
16. Id at 1374.
17. Id. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
18. Id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
19. 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
20. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 309, 309-10 (2002); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REv. 149, 149-51 (1997).
21. Sharpe, 267 Ga. at 271, 476 S.E.2d at 725.
22. Id. at 268, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
23. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L. REV. 279 (1999).
24. Id. at 279-80.
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interesting, if only for historical reasons, Georgia Supreme Court
decision decided during the current survey period, it appears the
author's prediction will not soon be realized.
In Roebuck v. State,25 the trial court convicted defendant, in 1999, of
a 1985 murder. Because defendant's indictment, fourteen years after the
murder, was based on the testimony of an accomplice, it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to produce some corroborating evidence of the
accomplice's testimony. To meet this burden, the State offered the
testimony of a fingerprint expert who testified that defendant's
fingerprints matched those on a fingerprint card labeled "Gregory
Roebuck." On appeal defendant contended that the fingerprint card,
which was admitted without objection, was hearsay and thus, could not
be used to support his conviction. Because the fingerprint expert's
testimony was based upon the fingerprint card, defendant argued there
was no admissible evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony. 6
A majority of the supreme court resolved this issue by holding that an
expert can base his opinion on hearsay." In view of this resolution of
the issue, the supreme court concluded that "there is no reason to
reconsider Georgia's long-standing rule that inadmissible hearsay lacks
probative value even though the opposing party does not object to its
introduction."2"
Justice Fletcher disagreed and, in a concurring opinion, argued that
the court should overrule prior cases holding that hearsay has no
probative value.29
Justice Fletcher noted that the corroborating
evidence relied on by the State included the fingerprint card, which was
clearly hearsay because "it rested 'mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons'; namely, the officer who took Roebuck's print and
labeled the print card."3 0 Justice Fletcher believed the majority ruling
"effectively allowed an expert to serve as a conduit for introducing
inadmissible evidence."31
This brought Justice Fletcher to the rule that hearsay has no
probative value. 2 If the fingerprint card had no probative value, even
though defendant did not object to its admission, then there was no

25. 277 Ga. 200, 586 S.E.2d 651 (2003).
26. Id. at 200-02, 586 S.E.2d at 651-55.
27. Id. This issue-whether an expert may base his opinion on hearsay-has also
taken some interesting historical twists and turns in Georgia. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 309, 327-28 (2002).
28. Roebuck, 277 Ga. at 204, 586 S.E.2d at 656.
29. Id. at 208, 586 S.E.2d at 659 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
30. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(a) (1995)) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
31. Id. (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
32. Id. at 209, 586 S.E.2d at 660 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
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corroborating evidence to support defendant's conviction. 33 To Justice
Fletcher the rule was simply an archaic legal fiction. 4 According to
Justice Fletcher, Georgia was the only jurisdiction in the country still
following the rule." Justice Fletcher argued that continued adherence
to this archaic rule would invariably lead to unfortunate consequences,
such as the majority's scramble to find some basis for upholding
defendant's conviction.3 6 Further, Justice Fletcher concluded that
"[blecause the majority cannot rely on the print card to corroborate, it
improperly uses expert testimony for this purpose. I would overrule our
longstanding rule and rely on the print card to corroborate." 37
It is difficult to fault Justice Fletcher's analysis. Why should hearsay
evidence admitted without objection be treated differently than any
other evidence admitted without objection? The majority's task would
have been a simple one if it had simply ruled that because defendant
failed to object to the print card, he could not on appeal contend that the
print card could not be used to corroborate his accomplice's testimony.
Yet the majority chose to rely on the principle that an expert can base
his opinion on hearsay.38 It is doubtful that this principle was intended
to apply to a necessary factual predicate for the application of an
expert's opinion to a particular case as opposed to information that
experts typically rely on, such as market data, scientific principles, and
similar general bodies of fact and information.
This is what led Justice Fletcher to question why the majority would
unnecessarily expand one hearsay exception onto treacherous ground to
preserve an "archaic" principle. The majority, however, did just that,
and as a result, it seems that archaic principle will likely be with us for
some time.

III.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior

A.

Georgia's Rape Shield Statute39 prohibits the admission of evidence
relating to the prior sexual behavior of a rape victim, unless the
behavior directly involves the accused and the evidence supports an
inference that the accused could have reasonably believed the victim

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 209-10, 586 S.E.2d at 660 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 210, 586 S.E.2d at 660 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 202, 586 S.E.2d at 655.
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (1995).
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consented to the sexual activity.40 Although the statute purports, or at

least apparently purports, to place an absolute ban on the admission of
such evidence, there has been some erosion of this total ban.4' Arguably, the effect of these inroads, including inroads made during the
current survey period, is to blur the distinction between admissible and
inadmissible evidence of prior sexual behavior.
In Ivey v. State,42 defendant, who was charged with aggravated
sodomy, argued that the trial court improperly barred him from
adducing evidence that he had paid the victim to have sex with him on
several occasions during the previous five years. Defendant claimed that
his visit to the victim on the night of the alleged crime was for the
purpose of again having consensual sex. The trial court ruled that
defendant could introduce no evidence about this relationship, including
the alleged reason for his visit.' The court of appeals held that this
was reversible error." The fact that defendant had a prior "customer-prostitute relationship" with the victim "would certainly support a
reasonable inference that he believed that his sexual relationship with
her on the night in question was consensual."4 5 Moreover, the court
held the evidence was admissible because it tended to prove the victim
had a motive to fabricate the allegation of rape.' To avoid being
charged with prostitution, the victim may have lied to the arresting
officer about the consensual nature of her relationship with defendant.4 7
Judges Miller, Ellington, and Phipps dissented from this holding.4"
With regard to the majority's conclusion that the evidence was admissible to prove a motive to fabricate, i.e., that the victim falsely accused
defendant to avoid a prostitution charge, the dissent noted that the
arresting officer never observed defendant and victim engaging in sex
and, thus, "it is difficult to envision how she could have had a motive to
make a false claim of rape to avoid prosecution for prostitution."4 9
With regard to the argument that the evidence was relevant to the issue
of consent, the dissent acknowledged that evidence of prior consensual

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. App. 137, 553 S.E.2d 823 (2001).
264 Ga. App. 377, 590 S.E.2d 781 (2003).
Id. at 378, 590 S.E.2d at 781-84.
Id.
Id. at 379, 590 S.E.2d at 783.
Id. at 382, 590 S.E.2d at 784-85.
Id. at 384, 590 S.E.2d at 786.
Id. at 389, 590 S.E.2d at 786-87 (Phipps, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
49.

Id at 386, 590 S.E.2d at 787 (Phipps, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sexual relations was logically relevant.5" Nevertheless, the Rape Shield
Statute barred such evidence except in the narrowest of circumstances.5 Given the fact that the physical evidence was consistent with the
victim's claims of a violent assault, the dissent argued that the trial
court was authorized, in its discretion, to conclude that the fact that
defendant may have had a prior consensual sexual relationship with the
inference that the victim consented to the
victim could not support 5an
2
violent behavior at issue.
The court of appeals decision in Payne v. State5 3 also illustrates the
deterioration of the bright line ostensibly created by the Rape Shield
Statute. 5 In Payne defendant, who was charged with child molestation, contended that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that
the victim had watched pornographic movies. Defendant argued that
this evidence was relevant to establish how the victim came to have
knowledge of various sexual acts. This was particularly important
because there was evidence that the victim had recanted her allegations,
and to explain how she knew about certain sexual acts, the victim said
she had watched a pornographic movie. 5
The court of appeals agreed that this evidence, although inadmissible
under the Rape Shield Statute, was relevant for another purpose-to
explain how the victim came to have knowledge of sexual acts.' The
court held, however, that the trial court did not err in precluding
defendant from introducing evidence about the pornographic movie
because "the defense could have shown that the victim had acquired
knowledge of the sexual acts from someone other than [defendant]
without specifying that her viewing of pornography was the mechanism
through which she had gained the knowledge."5 7 The court did not
explain how this could be done, and it is questionable whether either
side would be happy with testimony establishing that the victim had
detailed knowledge of sexual acts without explaining how she came to
have that knowledge. Indeed, it would seem the prosecution would be
more concerned if jurors were simply informed that the defendant had
such knowledge; they might conclude that the source of her knowledge
was actual sexual contact with someone else.

50. Id. (Phipps, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 385, 590 S.E.2d at 786-87 (Phipps, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 388, 590 S.E.2d at 789 (Phipps, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267 Ga. App. 498, 600 S.E.2d 422 (2004).
Id. at 502, 600 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 499, 600 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 501, 600 S.E.2d at 424.
Id.
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Finally, in Abdulkadir v. State,"8 the court of appeals acknowledged
that the trial courts must "compromise between the requirements of the
[R]ape [Sihield [S]tatute and [a defendant's] rights to a thorough and
sifting cross examination and to present evidence."59 Defendant, the
victim's stepfather, contended that the victim fabricated her claim that
he had molested her because she was upset that defendant had told the
victim's mother that the victim was leaving their apartment when she
thought her mother was at work. After defendant told the mother this,
the mother returned to the apartment complex and found her daughter
in a neighboring apartment with a young man who was partially
disrobed. Defendant contended that the victim raised her accusations
only after she learned that defendant had told on her.6 ° The court of
appeals held that the trial court properly ruled that defendant could
adduce evidence that the victim lied, but defendant could not "'go into
details and indicate that she was allegedly found in the bedroom of some
other boy with his pants down ....
It seems that the challenge for trial courts is where to draw the line
between allowing a defendant to show that a victim has a motive to
fabricate, and allowing defendants to prove why the victim has a motive
to fabricate when that motive is based on prior sexual activity.
B.

Miscellaneous

In Blackwell v. Potts, 62 the court of appeals addressed a relevancy
issue that will be of importance to attorneys unfortunate enough to find
In Blackwell
themselves defendants in a legal malpractice action.
plaintiff's first attorney withdrew from representing plaintiff in a
medical malpractice action after the case had been pending for over four
years. Plaintiff then retained defendants, and shortly thereafter, the
case was placed on a trial calendar. Defendants sought a continuance,
claiming they needed more time to secure the attendance of their expert
witnesses. The trial court refused and suggested that if defendants
needed more time, because of their recent entry into the case, they
should dismiss and refile. Defendants promptly did that, but they
overlooked the fact that more than five years had elapsed since the
alleged malpractice. Therefore, the statute of repose' barred the

58. 264 Ga. App. 805, 592 S.E.2d 433 (2003).
59. Id. at 808, 592 S.E.2d at 436.
60. Id. at 807, 592 S.E.2d at 436.
61. Id. at 807-08, 592 S.E.2d at 436.
62. 266 Ga. App. 702, 598 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
63. Id. at 705, 598 S.E.2d at 4.
64. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (1982 & Supp. 2004).
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refiled complaint. Having lost the claim against the doctor, plaintiff
then brought a malpractice claim against the lawyers, claiming they
breached the standard of care.65
In a legal malpractice case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that but for
his lawyer's negligence, he would have prevailed in the underlying
case.66 To meet this burden, plaintiff attempted to rely upon testimony
from medical experts who were not identified in the underlying case.67
Defendants moved, in limine, to prevent plaintiff from relying on these
new experts, and the trial court granted the motion, ruling that the
testimony of the new experts was not relevant because the "'case must
be judged on the circumstances of the case as it existed at the time the
defendants represented the plaintiffs.'""
The court of appeals granted plaintiff's application for interlocutory
review and reversed." The court acknowledged the difficulty of the
issue raised by the appeal.7" On the one hand, allowing plaintiffs to
introduce evidence that was not available to their attorneys in the
71
underlying case may give legal malpractice plaintiffs a "'windfall.'"
On the other hand, limiting the scope of relevant evidence to information
or evidence actually possessed by the allegedly negligent attorney would
allow that attorney to "avoid liability by intentionally or negligently
failing to develop a record."7 2 The court held that it would simply be
unfair to restrict legal malpractice plaintiffs to the record developed by
their allegedly negligent attorneys, and thus, reversed the trial court's
ruling that the testimony of the newly retained experts was not
relevant.73
IV.

PRIVILEGE

Georgia law recognizes an accountant-client privilege. 4 Thus,
communications between an accountant and his client are typically
privileged in the same manner as communications between an attorney
and a client.7 5 However, like the attorney-client privilege, the accoun-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Blackwell, 266 Ga. App at 704, 598 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 705, 598 S.E.2d at 4.
Id.
Id., 598 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 708, 598 S.E.2d at 6.
Id., 598 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 707-08, 598 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 706, 598 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 708, 598 S.E.2d at 5.

74. O.C.G.A. § 43-3-32(b) (2002).
75. Id.
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tant-client privilege is subject to the crime-fraud exception,76 a point
the survey period in Rose v. Commercial Factors of
reaffirmed during
77

Atlanta, Inc.

In Rose, plaintiff, a factoring firm, purchased a company's accounts
with its customers, one of which was defendant. When defendant failed
to pay its account, plaintiff sued claiming, inter alia, that defendant had
submitted false invoices to obtain funds from plaintiff. To prove its
claim, plaintiff noticed the deposition of defendant's accountant, Rose.
Relying on the accountant-client privilege, Rose refused to answer
questions even after the court compelled him to appear for a second
deposition. When Rose continued to refuse to answer questions, the
privilege. The court
court ordered him not to raise the accountant-client
78
certified its order for immediate review.
The court of appeals held that plaintiff had adduced sufficient
evidence to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the accountant-client
privilege.79 The president of the company, from which plaintiff had
purchased defendant's account, testified that false information concerning defendant's orders had been provided to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued
that Rose, as defendant's accountant, had to have known defendant had
submitted that false information.8 0 The court noted that the crimefraud exception does not require proof that a crime or fraud was
committed."' It is sufficient if the movant makes a prima facie case
that the privileged communication was made in furtherance of illegal or
Thus, evidence that, standing alone, is not
fraudulent activity.82
sufficient to prove improper activity, is sufficient to invoke the crimefraud exception, even though that evidence could be rebutted."8
Therefore, proof that defendant submitted false information to plaintiff
and that Rose, as defendant's accountant, knew or should have known
of this fact, was sufficient proof to pierce the accountant-client privilege.84

76. Rose v. Commercial Factors of Atlanta, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 528, 529, 586 S.E.2d 41,
43 (2003) (quoting In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings, 244 Ga. App. 380, 382, 535
S.E.2d 340, 343 (2000)).
77. 262 Ga. App. 528, 586 S.E.2d 41 (2003).
78. Id. at 528-29, 586 S.E.2d at 41-42.
79. Id. at 530, 586 S.E.2d at 43.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 529, 586 S.E.2d at 43.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 529-30, 586 S.E.2d at 43.
84. Id. at 531, 586 S.E.2d at 44.
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V. WITNESSES

In 1986 the court of appeals, in Tlley v. Page, 5 held that a plea of
nolo contendere could be used to impeach a witness in a civil case. 8
However, O.C.G.A. section 17-7-95(c) 7 provides that nolo pleas "shall
not be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as
an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any purpose .... "88 In 1989

the Georgia Supreme Court, in State v. Rocco,89 appeared to question
the validity of Tilley. In Rocco the supreme court reaffirmed that nolo
contendere pleas could not be used to impeach a criminal defendant.9 0
In what the author described as "a potentially portentous conclusion" in
the 1990 survey of Georgia evidence law, l the supreme court in Rocco
pointedly noted that the correctness of the court of appeals decision in
7llley was "not presented for decision in this case." s
Only fourteen years later, the author's suggestion that the holding in
IlIley would be short lived proved to be accurate. In Pittmon v. State,93
the court of appeals acknowledged that the holding in 71ley simply could
not be reconciled with the flat prohibition of O.C.G.A. section 17-7-95
against the use of nolo contendere pleas "for any purpose" against a
defendant.94 With all judges concurring, the court overruled T1lley.9
VI.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Expert Testimony
Since Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,9' federal courts
have struggled with their gatekeeper role in scrutinizing expert
evidence. Perhaps mindful of Daubert's travails in federal court and the
relatively limited resources of Georgia courts, the Georgia Supreme
Court and court of appeals have stubbornly resisted pleas for the judicial

A.

85.
86.
87.

181 Ga. App. 98, 351 S.E.2d 464 (1986).
Id. at 100, 351 S.E.2d at 466.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (2004).

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

259 Ga. 463, 384 S.E.2d 183 (1989).
Id. at 467, 384 S.E.2d at 185.
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REv. 223, 244 (1990).
259 Ga. at 467, 384 S.E.2d at 186.
265 Ga. App. 655, 595 S.E.2d 360 (2004).
Id. at 660, 595 S.E.2d at 364.

95. Id.
96. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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97
During the current survey period, the court of
adoption of Daubert.
appeals reaffirmed that it was not willing to adopt Daubert.98
In Bennett v. Mullally,99 the court of appeals also reaffirmed that a
qualified investigating police officer can express expert opinions with
regard to the cause of an accident he or she investigated.0 0 Specifically, the court in Bennett held that it was permissible for the investigating
officer to testify that one of the parties ran a red light.'"' This,
however, did not constitute an improper opinion on the ultimate issue
of whether defendant was negligent. Rather, it was permissible expert
testimony based on factual information about the sequence of events,
the traffic signal was red when defendant entered the
including whether
02
1
intersection.

B.

Lay Opinion

The court of appeals decision in Jackson v. State"° was both issued
and overruled during the survey period.' 4 In Jackson a court of
appeals panel held that the trial court properly allowed a witness to
testify that defendant was depicted in a store surveillance video. 0 5
The court rejected the argument that this was improper opinion
testimony invading the province of the jury.'0 6
In Carter v. State,'0 7 the full court of appeals disagreed.0 8 In
Carter the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court
improperly prevented testimony from his mother and aunt that he was
not one of the perpetrators depicted in a surveillance video. 0 9 The
court decided that the question of a person's identity shown on a
videotape was not beyond the knowledge of the ordinary juror, and
because that question of identity was the ultimate issue, it would be
improper to allow a lay person to offer such testimony. ' The court

97. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REv. 249, 259 (2003).
98. Bryant v. Hoffmann-Laroche, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 401, 585 S.E.2d 723 (2003).
99. 263 Ga. App. 215, 263 S.E.2d 385 (2003).
100. Id. at 218, 587 S.E.2d at 388.
101. Id. at 219, 263 S.E.2d at 389.
102. Id.
103. 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003).
104. Id. at 451, 585 S.E.2d at 751, overruled by Carter v. State, 266 Ga. App. 691, 693,
598 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2004).
105. Jackson, 262 Ga. App. at 455, 585 S.E.2d at 750.
106. Id.
107. 266 Ga. App. 691, 598 S.E.2d 76 (2004).
108. Id. at 693, 598 S.E.2d at 79.
109. Id. at 691, 598 S.E.2d at 78.
110. Id. at 693, 598 S.E.2d at 78.
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held its decision in Jackson was wrong to the extent that it held "that
a witness's opinion testimony as to the identity of a person depicted in
a video was admissible as a question of fact, alone, rather than as one
which the average juror could decide without assistance as well, ...
[and] it is overruled.""' Thus, under Carter, it is improper for a
witness to testify with regard to the identity of a person shown on a
videotape." 2
VII.

HEARSAY

The Necessity Exception
The precise birth date of Georgia's necessity exception can be debated,
but the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in McKissick v. State"3 must
shoulder much of the responsibility for this exception that has nearly
swallowed the rule. In McKissick, which was discussed in the 1994
survey," 4 the trial court permitted the boyfriend of defendant's wife
to testify concerning what the wife told him about her prior difficulties
with her husband. Defendant, who had been charged with the murder
of his wife, claimed that this testimony was hearsay."5 The supreme

A.

court, noting that O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1116 permits the use of hearsay

evidence "in specified cases from necessity," concluded that the testimony
was necessary because the victim was dead." 7 The court concluded
that the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement established that the victim's accounts were trustworthy."18
Although the author, over the years, ventured to criticize the everexpanding necessity exception, he acknowledged that the necessity
exception had become much too convenient a tool for prosecutors and
courts and that it was likely here to stay."9 Crawford v. Washington, 2' however, placed the necessity exception in jeopardy. Crawford
was decided March 8, 2004.121 Until the decision in Crawford, it was

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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O.C.G.A. § 34-3-1 (2003).
McKissick, 263 Ga. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at
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Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER
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business as usual in Georgia with regard to the necessity exception.'22
Two pre-Crawford cases, however, merit note.
the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed that a
In In re L.J.P. ,'
witness's out of court identification of a defendant, although hearsay, is
admissible when the declarant is available for cross-examination. 24
In L.J.P. when the victim could not identify defendant at trial, the court
allowed a police officer to testify that the victim identified defendant
before trial. 125 While it would seem that the victim's statement to the
police officer was "testimonial" as contemplated by Crawford, the fact
that the victim testified at trial likely removed any constitutional
infirmity.
Although there will likely be much judicial pondering over what is,
and is not, testimonial hearsay, the supreme court's decision in Wilson
v. State126 illustrates that there may also be some uncertainty on
whether the cross-examination requirement of Crawford is satisfied. In
Wilson, which again was decided prior to Crawford, the court wrestled
with an anomaly of Georgia law regarding prior inconsistent statements. 127 Pursuant to Gibbons v. State,"2 a decision discussed in
many prior surveys, 1 29 prior inconsistent statements of a witness are
admissible as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to crossexamination. 30 In Wilson the declarant took the witness stand but
refused to answer any substantive questions about a prior statement he
gave to the police. On cross-examination defendant's attorney simply
established that the declarant would not answer any of his questions
The prosecution then played the declarant's videotaped
either.
statement implicating defendant. Defendant contended that Gibbons did
not allow the introduction of the videotaped statement because nothing
the declarant said was inconsistent with his statement.' 3 ' The supreme court disagreed, noting that the declarant denied making a
statement to the police and his general" 132denial was "wholly inconsistent
with his entire videotaped statement.
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Justice Fletcher, in dissent, disagreed, noting that nothing in the
defendant's trial testimony conflicted with the substance of the
videotaped statement. 3 ' Had Crawford been decided, the court may
well have addressed, and likely will have to address at some point,
whether Crawford's requirement that the declarant be subject to crossexamination is satisfied if the declarant takes the stand but refuses to
answer questions.
Although there were several necessity exception decisions rendered
after Crawford, only two specifically addressed Crawford. First, in
Demons v. State,"M defendant contended that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from the victim's co-worker that the victim told
her, two days before his murder, that defendant was going to kill him.
The witness also testified that the victim was distressed, crying, and had
bruises on his arms and chest. ' The supreme court ruled that this
testimony satisfied the elements of the necessity exception but acknowledged that Crawford precluded the admission of testimonial hearsay.'3 6 Noting the United States Supreme Court's examples of testimonial hearsay, the court distinguished Crawford, reasoning that "the
victim's hearsay statements were not remotely similar to such prior
testimony or police interrogation, as they were made in a conversation
with a friend, before the commission of any crime, and without any
reasonable expectation that they would be used at a later trial."'37
In Bell v. State, 8 the other case citing Crawford, the supreme court
held that, pursuant to Crawford,the trial court erred when it admitted
39
The
out-of-court statements made by the victim to police officers.'
the
given
error
appellate court held, however, that this was harmless
that
other
fact
and
the
strength of the evidence against defendant
evidence corroborated the substance of the out-of-court statement. This
corroborating evidence, however, consisted of other hearsay statements
regarding prior difficulties between defendant and his victim, which
were made to two relatives and the victim's best friend. 4 ° The court
concluded that these statements were admissible under the necessity
Although the court did not mention Crawford, the court
exception.'
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135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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277 Ga. 724, 595 S.E.2d 76 (2004).
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likely concluded, without expressly stating, that these statements were
not testimonial hearsay.
In Williams v. State,' which was decided the same day as Bell, the
supreme court did not mention Crawford at all. Instead, the court held
that the statements failed to satisfy the third prong of the necessity
exception test-the hearsay evidence must be more probative of the fact
for which it is offered than other evidence that may be procured by the
prosecution.'" The subject matter of the hearsay statements was prior
difficulties between defendant and his victim, but because the prosecution had admissible evidence from other witnesses of such prior
difficulties, the court concluded that the trial court erroneously found
that the third prong of the hearsay necessity exception was estabNevertheless, the court concluded this was harmless error
lished.'
because of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.'45
Again, in Tuff v. State," the supreme court failed to mention
Crawford. In Tuff the challenged testimony consisted of hearsay
statements made by a victim to friends and relatives shortly before her
murder. 4 ' Had the court addressed Crawford, however, it would have
likely held that these statements did not constitute testimonial hearsay.
B.

Res Gestae

The holding in Crawford also raises issues concerning the res gestae
doctrine. In the interest of full disclosure, the author should acknowledge that long ago he joined those who criticize "that near-insoluble
As Judge Ruffim
enigma of our law, which we call res gestae.""'
stated during the current survey period, the res gestae doctrine is the
"grand octopus of the law, which stretches its clinging tentacles to
anything and everything a party says during the commission of an act,
or so near thereto [and] has been both a reliable and unreliable
exception to the hearsay rule."'49 Justice Weltner stated a little more
colorfully that:
Res gestae is a Gordian Knot, which no one has succeeded in untying.
Lacking an Alexander, it remains as yet unsevered. This brief survey
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should be sufficient to demonstrate the futility of attempting now still
another definition, for like Joel Chandler Harris' tar baby, striking
another blow means getting stuck another time!5 °
The question now is whether the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Crawford bars the admission of testimonial hearsay that may fall
within the vague boundaries of the res gestae exception. Or put another
way, does Georgia's res gestae doctrine somehow trump the United
States Constitution? It is, of course, too soon to know what will happen,
but, almost as if Georgia's appellate courts had some premonition of
Crawford, they turned to the res gestae exception rather than the
necessity exception much more frequently during this survey period.
Many of these decisions concerned the routine application of the res
gestae exception to non-testimonial hearsay, for example, the admission
of an emergency call to a 911 dispatcher.15 ' In other cases, however,
the res gestae doctrine was used to justify the admission of, arguably,
testimonial hearsay. For example, in White v. State,52 the court of
appeals held that a trial court properly admitted, pursuant to the res
gestae doctrine, a written statement given by an alleged victim to police
approximately thirty minutes after the police were dispatched to the
scene.' 53 It seems clear that this statement meets the United States
Supreme Court's definition of testimonial hearsay.
The question of whether the res gestae exception can trump the
United States Constitution was posed with tongue firmly in cheek. The
answer is clearly "no." It will be interesting, however, to see whether
Georgia courts will narrow the res gestae exception as a result of
Crawford.
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